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Case No. 950322-CA
Plaintiff / Appellee,
v.
RONNIE EARL CHAMBERS,
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Defendant / Appellant.
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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from Judgment and Sentence of conviction
of zoning ordinance violation, a class C
misdemeanor, in violation of Weber County Zoning
Ordinance 5-1 et seq. , and fire ordinance
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of Weber Fire Code Ordinance 11-1-1 et seq.,
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ARGUMENT
I.

REVERSAL OF DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION IS NOT ONLY
WARRANTED BY WEBER COUNTY'S FAILURE TO PROVE THE
ELEMENT OF OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT, BUT REVERSAL IS REQUIRED BY VIRTUE
OF
DEPUTY
WEBER
COUNTY
ATTORNEY
HURTADO'S
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT OF STEALTHILY HANDWRITING
DEFENDANT'S NAME, PRIOR TO TRIAL, ON THE PLAT MAP
UTILIZED AS PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1 AT TRIAL.

In its Brief, Weber County argues that the trial court correctly
denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss inasmuch as it had established
"a prima facie case against the defendant, specifically as to the
element

of

ownership

Appellee, p. 11).

of

the

subject

property."

(See Brief

of

Weber County's argument is seriously flawed for

the reasons set forth below.
"A prima facie case is proven when evidence has been introduced
which, in the absence of contrary evidence, would entitle the party
with the burden of proof to judgment as a matter of law."
Real

Property

at

633 East

640 North,

942 P. 2d 925, 931 n.l

1997) (Payne, D.J., concurring in result) (citing State
Utah 2d 34, 38, 268 P.2d

998, 1001

State

(1954)

v.
(Utah

v. Wood, 2

(citation omitted)).

Contrary to Weber County's standard of review stated in the Brief of
Appellee, a determination of whether a party has established a prima
facie case is a question of law, which the appellate court reviews

4

for correctness.

See Sorenson

v.

Kennecott-Utah

P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

Copper

Corp.,

873

The appellate court, in such

instances, typically views "the evidence in a light most favorable to
the trial court's findings."

Id.1

The record reveals that the trial court substantially, if not
exclusively, based its denial of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on
Plaintiff's Exhibit I,2 which is the plat map that Weber County's
counsel, Deputy Weber County Monette Hurtado, ultimately admitted

x

Arguably the evidence in the instant case should not be viewed
in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings because the
trial court's determination that Weber County had proved a prima
facie case was substantially, if not exclusively, premised upon
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. At the time of the trial court's ruling, it
was unaware that the plat map, i.e., Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, had been
altered by Deputy Weber County Attorney Hurtado prior to trial by her
handwriting the name "Ronnie Earl Chambers" on the plat map. This
also directly contravenes Weber County's argument concerning the
standard of review that typically applies in an insufficiency of the
evidence type of case. Furthermore, the trial court, as the record
indicates, did not enter any written findings of fact in support of
its ruling. In fact, the transcript of the trial court's ruling is
essentially devoid of any verbal findings of fact in support of its
ruling. Notwithstanding, even if the instant case is reviewed under
a less rigorous standard of review, reversal is appropriate in light
of the prosecutorial misconduct in the instant case.
2

After Weber County's case-in-chief, Mr. Ronnie Earl Chambers'
trial counsel moved to dismiss on the grounds that Weber County had
failed to tie the charges to Defendant, and that Weber County had
failed to establish Defendant as the property owner (R. 162, lines 414, Transcript of Trial) . In the course of denying the Motion to
Dismiss, the trial court stated, "The testimony has, in fact, been -and is shown up there [referring to Plaintiff's Exhibit 1] -- that
that particular plat [Plaintiff's Exhibit 1] -- that can be
challenged, clearly -- shows that the owner of this property is the
defendant. As a result of that, the motion is denied at this point."
(R. 162, lines 19-23, Transcript of Trial).
5

altering by handwriting the name "Ronnie Earl Chambers'' on it (R.
369,

Response ^f - Weber County

to Request

Defendant's Motion For Discovery; see
26 of Brief of Appellant).
Defendant's

also

Nos. 3, 4, and

7 of

Statement of Facts, Hf20-

Ms. Hurtado's action of handwriting

name on the plat

map

that

she, as

the prosecutor,

utilized throughout Defendant's trial to establish the element of
ownership for purposes of the alleged zoning and fire code ordinance
violations, constitutes prosecutorial misconduct.
misconduct,

as

discussed

below,

seriously

This prosecutorial
taints

Defendant's

convictions.
Utah appellate courts reverse on the basis of prosecutorial
misconduct if
the actions or remarks of the [prosecuting]
counsel call to the attention of the [judge or]
jury a matter it would not be justified in
considering in determining its verdict and, if
so, under the circumstances of the particular
case, whether the error is substantial and
prejudicial such that there is a reasonable
likelihood that, in its absence, there would
have been a more favorable result.
State v. Peters,
denied,

796 P.2d

708, 712

853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993); see

329, 335 (Utah 1991); State
App. 1998); State v.
cert, denied,

Boyatt,

v.

(Utah Ct. App. 1990), cert.
also

Longshaw,

State

v.

Span,

801 P.2d

961 P.2d 925, 927 (Utah Ct.

854 P.2d 550, 554-55 (Utah Ct. App.),

862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993).

As shown below, this two-

part test is more than satisfied in the instant case.

6

First, by utilizing the plat map altered by herself on the
morning prior to trial, Deputy Weber County Attorney Hurtado called
to the attention of the judge a matter or item of critical evidence
that

it

would

not

be

justified

Defendants' convictions.

in

considering

in

arriving

at

In fact, the record is replete with both

the use by Ms. Hurtado of the plat map, i.e., Plaintiff's Exhibit 1,
and the testimony by witnesses at trial in reference to the Exhibit
in

the

course

of

Weber

County's

attempts

ownership of the subject property (See, e.g.,

to

prove

Defendant's

R. 76-77, Transcript of

Trial; R. 87, lines 6-14, Transcript of Trial; R. 99, lines 5-16,
Transcript of Trial).

Further, the record evinces that the trial

court substantially, if not exclusively, relied upon Plaintiff's
Exhibit 1 in the course of denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for
failure to prove the element of ownership and in ultimately arriving
at Defendant's convictions (R. 163, lines 19-23, Transcript of Trial;
R. 327, lines 5-8, Transcript of Trial).
The utilization by Ms. Hurtado of the altered plat map, i.e.,
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, is exacerbated by Ms. Hurtado's failure, as an
officer of the court, to inform either the trial court or opposing
counsel of her alteration to the trial exhibit prior to utilizing
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 as evidence at trial.3

3

This failure underscores

Ms. Hurtado's alteration of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, i.e., the
plat map, is further exacerbated by the fact that on remand she, in
response to inquiries concerning the altered Exhibit, initially
represented that a Kinko's employee, per her instructions, had
7

the serious nature of the prosecutorial misconduct, not to mention
the failure by the prosecution to prove every element of the crimes
charged beyond a reasonable doubt.

See

State

v.

Harman,

767 P. 2d

567, 568 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("Every element of the crime[s] charged
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

If the evidence does not

support those elements, the verdict must fail.").
With respect to the second part of the prosecutorial misconduct
test, the circumstances of the instant case, including the quantum of
evidence presented at trial, establish that there is at least a
reasonable likelihood that in the absence of the altered plat map
utilized as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, there would have been a more
favorable result.

See

State

v.

Troy,

688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984)

(xxxIf proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged conduct or
remark will not be presumed prejudicial.'
less

compelling

proof,

[an appellate

scrutinize the conduct.") (quoting State

Likewise in a case with

court]
v.

Seeger,

will

more

closely

479 P. 2d 240, 241

handwritten the name "Ronnie Earl Chambers" on the plat map utilized
as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 at trial (See R. 345-46, letter from
appellate counsel to Deputy Weber County Attorney Hurtado, dated
February 13, 1996, and filed on February 20, 1996). Only upon formal
methods of discovery and the trial court requiring Weber County, by
way of Ms. Hurtado, to respond to Defendant's request for discovery,
did Ms. Hurtado, as Plaintiff's counsel, admit that she had altered
the plat map (See R. 359, letter from Ms. Monette Hurtado to
appellate counsel, dated February 14, 1996, attached to the Motion
for Continuance of Hearing as Attachment 2; R. 347-50, Motion for
Discovery; R. #65-66, Order; R. 368-69, Weber County's Response to
Defendant's Discovery Request Nos. 1, 3, 4, and 7 of Defendant's
Motion For Discovery).
8

(Or. 1971)).

As previously discussed, Weber County, in the course of

trial, almost exclusively relied upon the altered plat map in the
course of attempting to prove ownership by Defendant of the subject
property (See, e.g.,

R. 76-77, Transcript of Trial; R. 87, lines 6-

14, Transcript of Trial; R. 99, lines 5-16, Transcript of Trial).
Moreover, the trial court relied upon the altered Exhibit not only as
grounds for denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for failure to
prove the element of ownership at the close of Weber County's casein-chief, but it relied upon the altered Exhibit as grounds for the
ultimate determination of Defendant's convictions (See R. 163, lines
19-23, Transcript of Trial; R. 327, lines 5-8, Transcript of Trial).
As to the prejudice part of the prosecutorial misconduct test,
it is important to note that this is not a case where the prosecutor
inadvertently or unintentionally misstated the law and the trial
court

either

Rather,

had

Deputy

or

took

Weber

the opportunity

County

Attorney

to

cure

Hurtado,

the mistake.
as

previously

discussed, intentionally altered the plat map by handwriting the name
"Ronnie

Earl

Chambers" on the Exhibit

on

the morning

prior

to

Defendant's trial (R. 368-69, Weber County's Response to Defendant's
Discovery Request Nos. 1 3, 4, and 7 of Defendant's Motion For
Discovery) . Ms. Hurtado did not disclose the alteration to the trial
court or Defendant's counsel before attempting to utilize the plat
map

as

evidence

misrepresented

to

at

trial.

Defendant's

On

remand,

appellate
9

Ms.

Hurtado

counsel

that

initially
a

Kinko's

employee had altered the plat map, i.e., Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, per
her instructions (R. 345-46, letter from appellate counsel to Deputy
Weber County Attorney Hurtado, dated February 13, 1996, and filed on
February 20, 1996).

Only after a Motion For Discovery, a hearing

before the trial court, and an Order requiring Weber County, through
Ms. Hurtado, to respond to Defendant's discovery requests, did Ms.
Hurtado disclose that she had in fact altered the plat map (See R.
359, letter from Ms. Monette Hurtado to appellate counsel, dated
February 14, 1996, attached to the Motion for Continuance of Hearing
as Attachment 2; R. 347-50, Motion For Discovery; R. 365-66, Order;
R. 3 68-69, Weber County's Response to Defendant's Discovery Request
Nos. 1, 3, 4, and 7 of Defendant's Motion For Discovery).
Because the evidence of Defendant's guilt in the instant case is
weak, there is a presumption that the misconduct of the prosecutor is
prejudicial.
prosecutorial
County's

See

Troy,

misconduct

688

P. 2d at

486.

Notwithstanding

the

of altering the plat map, during Weber

case-in-chief, in the course of Ms. Hurtado presenting

Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, Weber County failed to make the requisite
foundational showing necessary to authenticate the Exhibit as an
accurate plat map from the Weber County Recorder's Office (See Brief
of Appellant, pp. 3 0-31).

By so doing, Weber County failed to prove

Defendant's ownership of the subject property during the alleged time
periods attendant to the charged crimes.

In addition, Mr. Barker's

testimony, as Director of the Weber County Planning Commission,
10

during

Weber

County's

case-in-chief,

further

indicates

that

he

utilized ownership books from his own office rather than those from
the Weber County Recorder's Office to research ownership of the
property (R. 76-77, Transcript of Trial).

On cross-examination, Mr.

Barker admitted, in contradiction to his prior testimony, that he
actually

utilized

the

correspondence

ownership of the property

(see id.

in

his

file

to

determine

at R. 84-85) , that there was

another person in his office more qualified to answer questions
concerning ownership of the property (see id.

at R. 84, lines 22-24),

and that he did not recall a property plat (see id.
21-22).
Storey,

Further, during the State's case-in-chief, Ms. Yvonne E.
a prior owner of the

according
"deeded"

at R. 84, lines

to

her

subject property,

understanding,

to Mr. Earl

Transcript of Trial).

the

subject

Chambers, Defendant's

testified that,

property

father

had

been

(See R. Ill,

This testimony is indicative of the confusion

that existed at trial, both on the part of the prosecution and the
trial court, concerning the crucial distinction to be made between
the identity of Defendant, Ronnie Earl Chambers, and his father, Earl
Chambers (See, e.g.,

R. 139-41, Transcript of Trial; see also

of Appellant, Statement of Facts, Ull) -4

4

Brief

The confusion between

See Plaintiff's Exhibit 14 (Letter dated June 16, 1994, from Mr.
Glen H. Burton, Weber District Fire Chief, to Deputy County Attorney
Hurtado, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as
Addenda C ) , in which Mr. Burton represents to Ms. Hurtado that the
subject property "is a construction equipment storage site owned by
Earl Chambers." Mr. Earl Chambers is Defendant's father.
11

Defendant, Ronnie Earl Chambers, and his father, Earl Chambers, at
trial is of particular significance in light of the alteration by Ms.
Hurtado when she handwrote the name "Ronnie Earl Chambers" on the
plat map utilized

l.5

as Plaintiff's Exhibit

By virtue of the

foregoing, there existed at least a hypothesis that someone other
than Defendant owned the subject property.

The evidence at trial

also supports the existence of the hypothesis that even if one were
to assume that Defendant did own the subject property, that he did
not

own

the

Information.

property

during

the

time

periods

alleged

the

The existence of these hypotheses necessarily raises a

reasonable doubt as to Defendant's guilt.

Consequently, the evidence

is insufficient to support Defendant's convictions.
Hill,

in

727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986); see

See

State

v.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501.6

5

At page 16 of the Brief of Appellee, Weber County argues that
the Ms. Hurtado's alteration of the plat map, i.e., Plaintiff's
Exhibit 1, is mitigated by Defendant's trial counsel having seen the
Exhibit prior to trial.
Notwithstanding, Deputy Weber County
Attorney Hurtado, as an officer of the court, had a duty to disclose
her unilateral alteration of the plat map to both the trial court and
opposing counsel prior to utilizing it as a trial exhibit. Further,
Defendant's trial counsel reasonably relied on the representation
that a true and correct copy of the plat map, when, in fact, it did
not by virtue of the alteration. Finally, Defendant's trial counsel,
even without the knowledge that the plat map had been altered,
vigorously objected to the Exhibit based on lack of foundation
grounds (See R. 162, lines 4-14, Transcript of Trial; R. 163,
Transcript of Trial).
6

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 provides, in relevant part:
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is
presumed to be innocent until each element of
the offense charged against him is proved beyond
a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof,
12

In its Brief, Weber County goes so far as to assert that both
Utah case law and statutory law do not require the State to prove
each element of the alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt (Id.
p. 12).

Contrary to Weber County's assertion,

u

at

it has long been

assumed that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is
constitutionally required."

In

S.Ct.

Further,

1068,

1071

(1970).

re Winship,

397 U.S. 358, 362, 90

* [i] t

is

the

duty

of

Government to establish . . . guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

the

This

notion -- basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free
society -

is a requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in

the historic, procedural

content

Oregon,

802-03,

343

U.S.

790,

of
72

(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also

x

Leland

due process.'"
S.Ct.
Patterson

1002,
v.

1009

v.

(1952)

New York,

432

U.S. 197, 210, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2327 (1977) ("the Due Process Clause
requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of
the elements included in the definition of the offense of which the
defendant is charged").

the defendant shall be acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words "elements
of the offense" mean:
(a)
The
conduct,
attendant
circumstances, or results of conduct
proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden
in the definition of the offense; or
(b) The culpable mental
state
required.

13

II.

BY REFUSING TO RULE ON DEFENDANT'S PENDING MOTIONS,
THE TRIAL COURT NOT ONLY FAILED TO ADDRESS ALL THE
ISSUES SURROUNDING THE ALTERED EXHIBIT AS REQUIRED BY
THIS COURT'S ORDER CONCERNING TEMPORARY REMAND, BUT IT
FRUSTRATED THE JUDICIAL PROCESS BY ITS FAILURE TO
RESOLVE THE MATTERS BEFORE IT PERTAINING TO THE
ALTERED TRIAL EXHIBIT.

Weber County argues that the trial court in its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Order either expressly or implicitly ruled
on Defendant's

pending

motions.

Such

a position

is

untenable

inasmuch as the trial court, among other failures, completely failed
to rule on Defendant's Motion to Amend and Clarify Findings and his
Objection to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Order, which incorporated the Motion to Amend and Clarify Findings
filed on July 22, 1996.7

By so doing, the trial court both failed and

refused to completely address the issues concerning the alteration of
the Exhibit as Ordered by this Court on January 29, 1996.

By so

doing, the trial court frustrated the judicial process and failed to
comply with this Court's Order concerning temporary remand (See Brief
of Appellant, pp. 36-3 9).

7

The trial court's date of signature of the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Order, i.e., August 28, 1996, and the file
date stamp of August 28, 1996, of Defendant's Objection to Proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order, which incorporated
Defendant's Motion to Amend and Clarify Findings of Fact and the
supporting Memorandum of Law filed on July 22, 1996, are indicative
of the trial court's failure to rule on Defendant's pending Motions.
14

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully asks that this
Court

reverse

Defendant's

convictions

and

remand

for

further

proceedings consistent with this Court's directions as stated in its
opinion.

15

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION
Defendant requests oral argument because oral argument will
materially enhance the decisional process due to the significant and
novel issues in the instant appeal dealing with the constitutional
right to due process by requiring the State to prove all elements of
the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, which, based on the
facts

of

the

instant

appeal,

involve

issues

requiring

further

development in these areas of criminal law for the benefit of bar and
public.

Counsel for Defendant further requests that the method of

disposition of the instant appeal be by opinion designated by the
Court "For Official Publication" for purposes of precedential value
and direction in future cases.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /M)
/X

day of October, 1998.

A ^ T O L D \ & WIGGINS,

P.C,

L Wiggins
Attorn4vs_Jx>r Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused to
be mailed two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Reply
Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid, to the following, on this 28th
day of October, 1998:
Ms. Monette Hurtado
Deputy Weber County Attorney
23 80 Washington Blvd. #23 0
Ogden, UT 8^4 01
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ADDENDUM
No Addendum is necessary pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 24(a)(11).
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